Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible?
An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations by Sebenius, James Kimble & Singh, Michael K.
 
Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible?
An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Sebenius, James K., and Michael K. Singh. "Is a Nuclear Deal
with Iran Possible? An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear
Negotiations." International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012):
52–91.
Published Version http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00108
Accessed February 19, 2015 11:01:19 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10578868
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-





Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible? 
 


















James K. Sebenius is a professor at the Harvard Business School and Director of the Harvard 
Negotiation Project.  Michael K. Singh is the managing director of the Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy.   
 
Without implicating others in the analysis or conclusions of this article, the authors are deeply 
grateful for the deliberations and feedback of the members of the Iran Negotiations Working Group at 
the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, c-chaired by Graham 
Allison and James Sebenius: Matthew Bunn, Joseph Costa, Olli Heinonen, David Lax, Martin Malin, Rolf 
Mowatt-Larssen, Jacqueline Newmyer, and William Tobey. 
   2 
Abstract 
 
Varied diplomatic approaches by multiple negotiators over several years have failed to 
conclude a nuclear deal with Iran. Mutual hostility, misperception, and flawed diplomacy may 
be responsible.  Yet, more fundamentally, no mutually acceptable deal may exist.  To assess this 
possibility, a “negotiation analytic” framework conceptually disentangles two issues: 1) 
whether a feasible deal exists and 2) how to design the most promising process to achieve one.  
Focusing on whether a “zone of possible agreement” exists, a graphical negotiation analysis 
precisely relates input assumptions about the parties’ interests, their no-deal options, and 
possible deals. Under a plausible, mainstream set of such assumptions, the Iranian regime’s no-
deal options, at least through summer 2012, appear superior to potential nuclear agreements.  
If so, purely tactical and process-oriented initiatives will fail.  Opening space for a mutually 
acceptable nuclear deal—that avoids both military conflict and a nuclear-armed or nuclear-
capable Iran—requires relentlessly and creatively worsening Iran’s no-deal options while 
enhancing the value to Iranian regime of a “yes.”  Downplaying both coercive options and 
upside potential, as international negotiators have often done, works against this integrated 
strategy. If this approach opens a zone of possible agreement, sophisticated negotiation will be 
key to reaching a worthwhile agreement. 
   3 
Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible? 
An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations 
 
Since assuming the presidency of the United States in January 2009, Barack Obama has tried both 
outreach and sanctions in an effort to halt Iran’s progress toward a nuclear weapons capability.  Yet 
neither President Obama’s personal diplomacy nor several rounds of talks between Iran and the 
five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council — China, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States — plus Germany (the “P5+1”) nor escalating sanctions have 
deterred Tehran.  Iran has not only continued but accelerated its nuclear progress, accumulating 
sufficient low-enriched uranium that, if further enriched, would be sufficient for five nuclear 
weapons.1  Consequently, as Iran makes major advances in its nuclear capabilities, speculation has 
increased that Israel or a United States–led coalition may be nearing the decision to conduct a 
military strike to disable Iran’s nuclear program.   
Analysts and policymakers have offered various explanations for the failure to make 
progress toward a negotiated resolution to the nuclear dispute with Iran.  A survey of these 
explanations would surface a multitude of barriers to a nuclear agreement — decades of hostility 
and estrangement, domestic politics on both sides, poor tactics and missed opportunities, to name a 
few.2  Indeed, U.S. tactics with respect to the Iran nuclear negotiations became a major point of 
                                                              
1 For a further technical discussion of Iran’s nuclear progress, see, for example, David Albright, Andrea 
Stricker, and Christina Walrond, “ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,” (Washington, D.C.: Institute 
for Science and International Security, May 25, 2012), http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-
reports/documents/ISIS_Analysis_IAEA_Report_25May2012.pdf. 
2  See, for example, John Limbert, Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of History (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009; Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran.  
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2012); and Barbara Slavin, “Engagement,” in Jon B. Alterman, ed., 
Gulf Kaleidoscope: Reflections on the Iranian Challenge (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and   4 
contention in the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, with candidate Barack Obama stressing 
engagement and candidate John McCain emphasizing sanctions and force.   
Amid this preoccupation with diplomatic processes — whether to offer a bottom-line deal 
or a phased agreement, whether to seek a grand bargain or a narrow understanding, whether to 
declare a deadline for talks or not, whether to deal directly or through intermediaries, whether 
“front” or back channels are more promising, whether a multilateral (P5+1) or bilateral U.S.-Iran 
format would be better, and so on — a more fundamental issue has become obscured: Is there any 
outcome to the nuclear crisis upon which Iran and the United States could both agree?  The inability 
of multiple international negotiators, via a variety of diplomatic processes, to conclude a nuclear 
deal with Iran raises the possibility that no deal has been feasible over the course of the 
negotiations, at least through the fall of 2012.  This article seekd to separate the question of 
whether a mutually acceptable deal is possible from the question of the most promising diplomatic 
processes and tactics to reach a worthwhile deal.  
This is a distinction that in more routine contexts is intuitively familiar.  For example, if you 
are seeking to buy a house and have an absolute upper limit of $400,000, but the current owner of 
the house—who cares solely about price—has another credible offer for $500,000, no deal is 
possible, regardless of your negotiating skill or bargaining approach.  If, on the other hand, the 
house’s owner has a credible offer of $375,000, a deal with you is possible, but by no means 
inevitable. Whether it is reached and what price is agreed—from $375,000 to $400,000—depends 
on the negotiating tactics of both parties.  Likewise, if the minimum nuclear capability the Iranian 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
International Studies, May 2012), pp.11-21.   5 
regime is willing to accept exceeds the maximum the United States will tolerate, no nuclear deal is 
possible absent steps to bridge this divide. 
In negotiating parlance, whether a deal is feasible (i.e., mutually acceptable) is said to 
depend on the existence of a “zone of possible agreement” (ZOPA).  A ZOPA is the range of potential 
deals that are better in terms of each party’s perceived interests than the best alternative to a 
negotiated agreement (or “no-deal option”) of each party.   
Sometimes no-deal options consist of alternative offers or their absence (as in the house-
selling example above); in other cases, no-deal options entail different consequences of walking 
away.  For example, refusing to settle a lawsuit normally implies (facing the no-deal option of) going 
to court, with its attendant costs and risks.  A firm’s no-deal option in union bargaining will often be 
a strike.  Failing to come to agreement with one potential alliance partner may lead to negotiations 
with another, or simply going it alone.  In these examples, there might be no ZOPA in the initial 
negotiation, if one side were, respectively, absolutely convinced it would prevail in court (in the 
lawsuit example), believed it would quickly and costlessly break a strike (in the union bargaining 
example), or judged that it would find an even more appealing alliance partner quickly or do better 
alone (in the alliance negotiation example).3 Opening up a ZOPA would require actions to alter 
these perceptions, often by changing the underlying realities.  Across these and more complex 
cases, a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for each party’s reaching agreement is that the 
deal appear superior, in terms of each party’s subjectively perceived interests, to its best no-deal 
option.  
                                                              
3 There is no assumption or expectation in the analysis that perceptions of a ZOPA are common knowledge or 
that the sides have “perfect information.”  In fact, the essence of many negotiating situations is uncertainty 
over the existence, let alone the scope and dimensions, of a ZOPA.  Typically, each side has a view of its own 
limits (implying “its end” of the ZOPA), but faces considerable uncertainty about that of the other.   6 
To explore whether a nuclear deal with Iran is possible — that is, whether a ZOPA exists —
this article introduces a simple analytical framework designed to visualize the ZOPA and therefore 
the range of feasible deals, and how they would be affected by different assumptions and policy 
choices.  In essence, the framework offers a means of displaying whether a deal exists that is 
simultaneously better for both sides than their most likely no-deal options..  The major contribution 
of this article is, in a sense, the framework itself — that is, a format to separately assess the distinct 
elements of the Iran nuclear negotiations, to make deliberate assessments with regard to each of 
them, and put them in proper analytic relationship to each other in order to draw valid conclusions 
and make more effective policy decisions.  Prescriptively, this approach indicates the 
complementary roles of cost-imposing and value-enhancing moves in opening space for a potential 
deal.   
In particular, discussions of the Iran nuclear negotiations often confuse, artificially separate,  
or conflate several relevant factors that, when properly considered, bear a precise relationship to 
each other and, together, determine the underlying potential for a deal.  These include each side’s 
interests, each side’s no-deal option (and implied minimum acceptable conditions for a deal), each 
side’s stated bargaining position, the range of possible agreements, actual or threatened costs, as 
well as actual or promised incentives and benefits.  It is easy, for example, for analysts to 
compartmentalize sanctions, military activities and threats of coercive measures, and other cost-
imposing moves as somehow independent from “negotiation” and possible value-creating options.  
The framework developed in this article offers the potential to unify these often-separate elements 
into a coherent negotiating strategy.   7 
It is frequently asserted that negotiating with the Iranian regime is not unlike haggling in 
the carpet bazaars of Tehran, where one must keep one’s wits or be outsmarted by the savvy 
merchants.  No wiles, however, will help the poor carpet consumer whose best offer is less than the 
price that the merchant can rapidly and confidently get from another buyer.  More generally, if one 
party sees walking away (no-deal) as better than any deal potentially on offer by the other, 
agreement will not be struck. For Iran and the United States, the fundamental challenge for 
negotiation is finding an agreement that is better —in the eyes of both parties —than the two most 
likely no-deal options: war or an Iran armed with nuclear capabilities.  The existence of a ZOPA is a 
prerequisite for diplomatic success by whatever process.  If no such zone of possible agreement can 
be created, then the alternatives, however unpalatable, must be considered. 
At the time of this writing, overt negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 were on hold, 
despite reports that they might resume after the U.S. presidential election.  Sanctions were being 
tightened, and the possibility of coercive action was increasingly discussed and demonstrated.    
However this issue evolves over time, the framework developed in this article for assessing 
whether a zone of possible agreement exists—and the classes of measures necessary to create or 
widen a ZOPA—should prove to be useful input to the use and design of diplomatic processes in 
many issue domains.   
The next section qualitatively develops the basic logic of this approach along with 
appropriate caveats. To develop first-order implications of the framework, this qualitative 
introduction posits and discusses a mainstream set of policy “input assumptions” about each side’s 
interests and no-deal options as well as potential deals.  The following section takes the analysis 
further, visually illustrating the existence and location of a ZOPA, or its absence, in U.S.-Iranian   8 
nuclear dealings.  The graphical analysis also shows the effects on a ZOPA of various cost-imposing 
and value-enhancing measures.  While the framework, whether expressed qualitatively or 
graphically, is robust to a wide range of policy assumptions, we show that, under a fairly 
mainstream set of policy views, it is unlikely that a ZOPA exists as of this writing.  The next section 
discusses in greater detail the characteristics required of cost-imposing and value-enhancing moves 
to open up a ZOPA.  Following an assessment, using this framework, of past negotiating efforts 
under U.S. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the final section offers conclusions and 
recommendations.  
A Simple Analytical Framework: Qualitative Introduction 
 
Much of the popular discussion of negotiations, whether on the Iran nuclear issue or other topics, 
centers on tactics and process.  Examples include whether to employ intermediaries or deal 
directly, negotiate with counterpart officials or through back channels, employ a multilateral or 
bilateral format in talks, operate publicly or in secret, seek to deeply empathize with differences of 
culture and perception or let issues speak for themselves, engage in small talk and relationship 
building or get straight to the point, bully or charm, show one’s cards or keep them close to the vest, 
focus early on guiding principles or on specifics, start with exaggerated demands or more 
reasonable ones, seek to build momentum by tackling easy issues first, press hard for early closure 
via deadlines or let the process proceed at a more relaxed pace, and so on.   
Such “at-the-table” matters are not trivial, but they are only one “dimension” of a fuller, 
“three dimensional (3D)” approach to negotiation analysis.4  Beyond tactics, the second dimension 
                                                              
4 For a fuller, relatively accessible description of the methodological approach implicit in this article, see 
David A. Lax, and James K. Sebenius. 3D Negotiation (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006).  For more   9 
is deal design – that is, creatively structuring potential agreements so that they maximize value for 
all parties and prove sustainable.  The third, more “architectural,” dimension is the underlying 
“setup” of the negotiation — that is, the parties, their interests and no-deal options, the sequence of 
approach, and actions to shape those factors to increase the likelihood of a successful outcome once 
the parties arrive at the table.  In this article’s ”negotiation analytic” framework, we move away 
from the tactical dimension and focus on the setup and deal design dimensions, especially the 
parties, interests, and no-deal options in the context of potential deals. 
Specifically, we seek to address the first two of what we believe are three critical questions 
facing U.S. policymakers on Iran.  First, within the existing setup, is any mutually acceptable deal 
possible, given each side’s perception of its interests and no-deal options?  That is, is there, as of 
this writing, a zone of possible agreement on nuclear issues between the U.S. government and the 
hard-line Iranian regime?  Second, if not, can moves to change the setup or deal design alter one or 
both party’s calculations to make a deal feasible, that is, to create a ZOPA?  The third question, not 
addressed here, pertains to those tactical and process choices that would be most likely to realize a 
deal, were one feasible.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
technically minded readers, the “negotiation analytic” methodology adopted in this article lies between 
conventional game theory and decision analysis. See James K. Sebenius, "Negotiation Analysis: A 
Characterization and Review," Management Science, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 1992), pp. 1-21; and Howard 
Raiffa, John Richardson and David Metcalfe, Negotiation Analysis: The Science and Art of Collaborative Decision 
Making (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002).  For an updated account, see 
James K. Sebenius, "Negotiation Analysis: Between Decisions and Games," in Ward Edwards, Ralph Miles, and 
Detlof von Winterfeldt, eds., Advances in Decision Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 
469-488. For this approach applied more specifically to international negotiation problems, see James K. 
Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of 
Epistemic Communities," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 323-365; and James K. 
Sebenius, "International Negotiation Analysis," in Victor Kremenyuk, ed., International Negotiation: Analysis, 
Approaches, Issue, 2d ed. (San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 229-252.   10 
CAVEATS 
 
Some advance caveats are in order, given the purposeful simplicity of this framework.  We 
consciously focus the bulk of our attention on the official U.S.-Iranian nexus given its central 
importance to this policy area.  Obviously, however, nuclear negotiations involve a range of players 
such as the other P5+1 parties, Israel, and the Arab states, each of which has its own interests and 
no-deal options.  In addition, the United States and Iran themselves are hardly monolithic, but 
rather are composed of internal parties such as, on the U.S. side, the White House, Congress, and 
various partisan factions.  Preferences and interests are sensible, especially in a political context as 
riven with divisions as Iran’s, only to the extent they are understood “factionally.”  The presentation 
of incentives or imposition of costs on Iran by the United States involves complex negotiations with 
these external and internal parties.  It is entirely possible that the failure of these negotiations could 
result in one side being blocked by an internal party from exploiting a ZOPA if it opens.  In fact, this 
may have been what occurred in October 2009, when Iranian negotiators in Vienna appeared to 
agree to a nuclear fuel swap, only to have it scuppered by leaders in Tehran. We do not explore such 
internal negotiations in this article, but they are implicitly represented—not ignored—by the 
framework we present.  
In light of these caveats, a fuller negotiation analysis would build on the framework 
presented in this article to probe important related questions such as: (1) the most effective ways 
to manage each side’s challenging “internal” negotiations “on its own side of the table,” including 
potentially complex U.S.-Israeli interactions, as well as how U.S. moves could affect the internal 
Iranian negotiations and vice versa; (2) how best to negotiate potential durable coalitions of parties 
as diverse as China, Israel, Russia, the European Union (EU), and the Gulf Arab states that could   11 
tighten sanctions (or other costs) on Iran, provide incentives to it, or both; (3) how to counter 
ongoing and future moves by Iran intended to divide or weaken potentially adverse coalitions of 
parties; and (4) the relationship between early conciliatory moves for engagement and building 
wider support for possible later moves, if necessary, to confront Iran more forcefully. 
A further set of caveats is in order.  Even within our relatively simple two-party setup, 
valuations and preferences — relative as well as absolute — and no-deal options are often vague, 
frequently contested among analysts and policymakers alike, and are shaped by distrust and 
partisan perceptions.  This article presents an assessment of how Iranian and U.S. decisionmakers 
perceive their interests and no-deal options, but it is vital to note that these assessments, and more 
important each side’s perceptions of the other, are only as good as the available information and 
interpretations. 
Finally, we assume, as does the U.S. intelligence community, that “Iran’s nuclear 
decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach.”5  This neither implies perfect rationality or 
perfect information, nor does it assume that Iranian leaders’ valuation of costs and benefits 
resembles that of the United States.6  Rather, it assumes that the regime acts in a roughly purposeful 
fashion to advance its interests as best it sees fit.7  As such, understanding how the regime assesses 
its interests and no-deal options is vital to predicting behavior.    
                                                              
5David Blair, U.S. Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment, statement, for the record for the Senate 
Elect Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2010. 
6 For an extended discussion of the issue of whether the Iranian regime is “rational,” see Michael Singh, “Is the 
Iranian Regime Rational?,” Foreign Policy, February 23, 2012, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/is-the-iranian-regime-rational. 
7 We are fully aware of the roles that misperception, miscalculation, “irrational” escalation, emotion, and the 
like can play in negotiation—and the extensive literature on these subjects.  A (weakly) rational baseline, 
however, such as this paper provides, remains useful for analysis—with such factors later incorporated as 
appropriate.      12 
With these caveats in mind, the analytical framework we employ to address these questions 
requires a few basic “inputs” or policy assumptions about the parties’ key interests and no-deal 
options, as well as potential agreements. Although a range of creative options might be envisioned, 
with many possible provisions and linkages to issues such as trade and energy development, we 
initially focus on outcomes or deals limited to nuclear issues of central concern to policymakers.  
(The analysis later brings in broader, nonnuclear issues as potential deal ingredients.)  Moving from 
the most “U.S.-favoring” to the most “Iran-favoring” possibilities, these potential agreements 
include a rollback of the Iranian nuclear program, a freeze of Iran’s uranium-enrichment activities, 
strong restrictions on enrichment, weak restrictions on enrichment, nuclear “latency,” actual 
weaponization, and an Iran with many warheads and missile delivery systems. Associated with 
each of these outcomes are monitoring and enforcement provisions , which do not necessarily vary 
in a linear fashion from one outcome to the next (i.e., it is not necessarily the case that a more 
restrictive outcome requires more monitoring and vice versa).   
 
U.S. AND IRANIAN INTERESTS 
 
Beyond potential deals, the analysis also requires an assessment of each side’s interests.  In the U.S. 
case, these can be drawn largely from officials’ own statements, whereas in the case of the Iranian 
regime, they must be inferred from actions, behavior, and the numerous studies on the regime’s 
ideology.8  While the assessments below are mainstream and widely held by the U.S. and allied 
governments, one strength of the analytical framework discussed below is its openness to a wide 
                                                              
8 For a particularly useful study of the attitudes of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, see Karim 
Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader (Washington, D.C., Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2009), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sadjadpour_iran_final2.pdf.   13 
range of possible assumptions that reflect different points of view and thus different implications 
for the negotiations. 
First, our analysis assumes that Iran, or more precisely, the hard-line Iranian regime, has a 
keen interest in and is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.  This reflects the judgment of the U.S. 
intelligence community,9 and can reasonably be inferred from the collection of nuclear activities in 
which Iran is engaged: fuel fabrication, weaponization research, and missile delivery systems, 
which together are the key components of a nuclear weapon.  We do not assume, however, that Iran 
will build a nuclear weapon, though this obviously is a possible outcome. 
Although Iran has consistently denied its interest in acquiring nuclear weapons or the 
capability to produce them, many observers judge that Iran places a high priority on a nuclear 
weapons capability given its defiance of Security Council resolutions, its failure to satisfy concerns 
voiced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its history of concealed facilities.10  
More broadly, the Iranian regime’s overriding interests appear to be its own survival and the 
persistence of the current velayat-e faqih system of government (“guardianship of the religious 
jurist” or absolute power of a ruling cleric).  The development of a nuclear weapon would serve 
these interests by acting as a deterrent, a fact openly acknowledged by Iranian officials in the late 
                                                              
9 For example, in his 2012 briefing to the Senate, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated: "We 
assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear 
capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so." Clapper, Worldwide 
Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, unclassified statement for the record for the Senate Elect 
Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C., January 31, 2912, p. 5, 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf. 
10 Residual doubts are fairly commonly expressed by credible outsiders as well. For example, Yukiya Amano, 
the U.S.-backed head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, was forthright in an interview criticizing 
Iran's failure to cooperate or answer critical questions about highly suspicious activities. Yet he stated, 
"Despite all unanswered questions, we cannot say that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program." 
Interview with Amano, Der Spiegel, January 11, 2011, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,738634,00.html.   14 
1980s, when they cited the need for such weapons in light of Iran’s concerns about perceived 
threats from Iraq and Israel,11 and likely reinforced by the contrasting examples of a nonnuclear 
Iraq (invaded), a denuclearized Libya (also invaded), and a nuclear North Korea (not invaded).  A 
nuclear weapon would serve other likely regime interests as well, by strengthening Iran’s would-be 
hegemonic military and political position in the Gulf region and admitting it to the exclusive global 
club of nuclear powers. The regime certainly has other interests, and its primary interest of regime 
survival depends not only on deterrence of external threats but also on economic prosperity and 
domestic stability, among other things.   
We assume that a major U.S. aim is to prevent Iran from acquiring such a nuclear weapons 
capability. This was the U.S. objective under President George W. Bush and has remained so under 
President Obama.  U.S. officials frequently and explicitly describe the nature of the Iranian threat to 
U.S. national security.  For example, in testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Deputy Secretary of State William Burns stated the following: 
A nuclear-armed Iran would severely threaten the security and stability of a part of the world crucial 
to our interests and to the health of the global economy. It would seriously undermine the credibility 
of the United Nations and other international institutions, and seriously weaken the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime at precisely the moment when we are seeking to strengthen it. These risks 
are only reinforced by the wider actions of the Iranian leadership, particularly its longstanding 
support for violent terrorist groups like Hizballah and Hamas; its opposition to Middle East peace; its 
                                                              
11 For examples, see the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s chronology of Iran’s nuclear program, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology.html.   15 
repugnant rhetoric about Israel, the Holocaust, 9/11, and so much else; and its brutal repression of 
its own citizens.12 
Omitted from this statement is the damage that Iran’s successful development of a nuclear 
weapons capability would have on U.S. influence and credibility in the Middle East and beyond.  
Given Washington’s long-standing role as an external guarantor of stability in the region and its 
repeated presidential commitment to prevent Iran’s nuclearization, failure in its aims would 
inevitably damage U.S. standing.   
U.S. AND IRANIAN PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR NO-DEAL OPTIONS 
 
Beyond enumerating potential deals and each side’s interests, the framework calls for an 
assessment of each side’s perception of what would happen if no deal were reached (its “no-deal 
option”).  Relative to an interest assessment, the United States’ and Iran’s perceived no-deal options 
are more difficult to judge, as they require some speculation about how each side assesses what 
would actually transpire absent a negotiated agreement. 
The United States’ no-deal option — that is, its policy path should a negotiated agreement 
with Iran fail to be reached — has been a matter of significant controversy among analysts and 
policymakers.  Absent an agreement limiting or eliminating Iran’s nuclear program and without a 
change in the current U.S. approach, the likely outcome over time appears to be at least an Iranian 
nuclear weapons capability.  If this transpires, the United States will need to choose between 
seeking to “contain” Iran or engaging in a military attack to destroy Iranian nuclear capabilities, 
assuming that passive U.S. acquiescence is off the table.  Containing a nuclear-capable Iran will 
                                                              
12 William J. Burns, “Implementing Tougher Sanctions on Iran: A Progress Report,” statement before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., December 1, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/152222.htm.   16 
presumably be significantly more difficult than containing a nonnuclear Iran, which itself has 
proven a formidable challenge.  At the same time, the United States — from a position of weakened 
influence and credibility — would need to maintain an international coalition in support of 
sanctions, when many countries may have a greater interest in accepting and accommodating 
Tehran’s new nuclear status and resuming full economic and political relations.  Over the longer 
term, the emergence of a nuclear-capable Iran may well spur other Middle Eastern powers to seek 
nuclear weapons capabilities of their own, presenting the United States with a new and challenging 
outburst of nuclear proliferation. 
The other alternative to a negotiated agreement — an attack on Iran — is also not without 
downsides.  Analysts and policymakers fear that a military attack would entail significant risk—
operationally, economically, and in terms of likely retaliation—with uncertain efficacy.  It is 
possible that keeping an Iranian nuclear weapons capability at bay would necessitate not just one 
but multiple attacks over the course of several years.  Furthermore, an attack could prompt Iran’s 
withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty, the loss of the existing limited IAEA access in Iran, 
and a significant reduction in international support for sanctions. Top U.S. officials, including 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and former Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen, frequently warn about the downsides of military 
action against Iran, though noting that the possibility remains “on the table.”13  They similarly 
inveigh against Israeli military action.14   
                                                              
13 See, for example, Adm. Mike Mullen, “Columbia University Press Avail,” 
http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1364. 
14 See for example Paul Richter, “Gates Warns Against Israeli Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities,” Los Angeles 
Times, April 16, 2009.   17 
It should come as little surprise that neither alternative to a negotiated agreement with Iran 
appears especially palatable — if it were, the United States under both Presidents Bush and Obama 
would not have expended so much time and effort on the negotiations themselves.  Yet a choice 
must be made, and both Bush and Obama have clearly stated their preference for the “military 
option” to containment.  In a March 2012 speech to a conference held by the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), President Obama stated, “When it comes to preventing Iran from 
obtaining a nuclear weapon, I will take no options off the table, and I mean what I say. That includes 
all elements of American power: a political effort aimed at isolating Iran, a diplomatic effort to 
sustain our coalition and ensure that the Iranian program is monitored, an economic effort that 
imposes crippling sanctions and, yes, a military effort to be prepared for any contingency.”  He 
further declared, “I do not have a policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from 
obtaining a nuclear weapon. And as I have made clear time and again during the course of my 
presidency, I will not hesitate to use force when it is necessary to defend the United States and its 
interests.”15 Whether this also implies a firm commitment to prevent Iran from developing a 
nuclear weapons capability, short of building a nuclear weapon, is unclear.   
One of the great frustrations of U.S. policymakers and their counterparts in P5+1 countries 
is that, despite this avowed willingness to resort to military action and good-faith efforts to 
negotiate as an alternative to conflict, P5+1 negotiators have judged that Iranian proposals have not 
appeared to be seriously aimed at reaching compromise, at least through the Moscow talks in June 
2012.  This suggests that  the Iranian regime views its own no-deal option favorably – as superior, 
at least, to the offers made thus far in the P5+1 talks.  Indeed, all signs suggest that the Iranian 
                                                              
15 Barack Obama, speech given at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee Policy Conference, 
Washington, D.C., March 4, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73588.html.   18 
regime likely sees its no-deal option as, in the absence of a negotiated agreement, an obstructed but 
still feasible path over time to a nuclear weapons capability.     
This observation raises the question of why, if U.S. policymakers view military conflict as 
the most likely alternative to a negotiated agreement, the Iranian regime either does not see that 
eventuality as likely or does not worry overmuch about the consequences of such an outcome.  The 
first explanation is provided above — U.S. officials, despite President Obama’s insistence that the 
military option remains “on the table,” often publicly deflate the notion that the United States will 
resort to force, and talk up the downsides of such a course of action to, some would say, the point of 
exaggeration.16  Perhaps more important — if one believes that actions speak louder than words — 
over much of the last several years, the United States has made relatively little overt show of laying 
the groundwork, militarily or diplomatically, for a military offensive against Iranian nuclear 
facilities.  Instead it appears to be signaling the construction of a regional containment regime 
consisting of missile defenses and other such defensive measures.  This appeared to be changing in 
autumn 2012 as a series of visible military moves, especially joint minesweeping exercises in the 
region among some twenty-five countries, appear tailored to influence Iran’s perceptions.17   
The Israelis themselves have sent mixed messages regarding an attack on Iran, which could 
rapidly lead to U.S. involvement.  Although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense 
Minister Ehud Barak have warned of the possibility of an Israeli attack, they have done so for many 
years, which likely reduces the credibility of such warnings.  In addition, other current and former 
                                                              
16 For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Michael Eisenstadt and Michael Knights, “Beyond Worst-Case 
Analysis: Iran’s Likely Responses to an Israeli Preventive Strike,” Police Notes, No. 11 (Washington, D.C.: 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2012). 
17 See, for example, David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “To Calm Israelis, U.S. Offers Ways to Restrain Iran,” 
New York Times, September 3, 2012.   19 
Israeli officials, as well as Israeli President Shimon Peres, have warned in stark terms against an 
Israeli attack on Iran—with regard to its limited longer-term effectiveness, likely retaliation by Iran 
and its proxies, and cost in relations with the United States—projecting the sense that the matter is 
far from decided in Israel.18  In any event, it may be assumed that the Iranian regime — if it values 
survival above all else — worries less about an Israeli strike, which would likely be limited by 
Israeli capabilities to hit a narrow target set, than it does about a U.S. attack, which could have 
regime change as its object or effect. 
Thus, in the absence of a negotiated agreement, the Iranian regime may foresee few 
insuperable impediments in the path toward a full nuclear weapons capability, though the timing of 
that trajectory will certainly be affected by actions of outside players.  Consecutive rounds of 
sanctions have had a significant impact on the Iranian economy, but not apparently on the regime’s 
nuclear ambitions.  Nor do US policymakers appear to harbor hope that this will change; asked in 
June 2010 about the effects of greatly enhanced U.S. and Security Council sanctions, then-Director 
of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta responded, “Will it deter them from their ambitions with 
regards to nuclear capability? Probably not.”19  Iran may also question the resilience of the current 
sanctions regime, given the likely increase in oil demand when global macroeconomic conditions 
improve, as well as historical cases such as the gradual degradation of sanctions against Iraq in the 
1990s or the international community’s speedy accommodation of Pakistan’s nuclear status that 
same decade.  
                                                              
18 See, for example,  Shai Feldman, “The Israeli Debate on Attacking Iran is Over,” Foreign Policy, August 20, 
2012, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/20/the_israeli_debate_on_attacking_iran_is_over, or, 
highlighting the dissent of former Mossad chief, Meir Dagan, see David Remnick “The Vegetarian,” The New 
Yorker, September 3, 2012. 
19 Jake Tapper interview with CIA Director Leon Panetta, ABC News, “This Week,” Sunday, June 27, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/week-transcript-panetta/story?id=11025299&page=1.   20 
Mostly implicit in the foregoing discussion is the critical and asymmetric role of the passage 
of time on each side’s no-deal options.  The U.S. interest in preventing a nuclear Iran is heightened 
by the widely held judgment that the time remaining before which Iran could produce nuclear 
weapons, if it chose to do so, is relatively short.  This reflects the U.S. intelligence community’s 
judgment that “Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly-enriched uranium for a 
weapon in the next few years [as of early 2010], if it chooses to do so.”20  Western intelligence 
officials have suggested that their efforts have delayed Iranian nuclear progress, but they have not 
significantly changed the timetable for Iran to achieve nuclear weapons status.  According to British 
press reports, British intelligence (MI6) Chief Sir John Sawers claimed that Western efforts had 
prevented Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon by 2008, but that it would nevertheless achieve 
that goal by 2014 absent U.S. or Israeli military action.21  Simply put, therefore, as time passes 
without an effective nuclear agreement, centrifuges spin, Iran’s nuclear program is buried in ever 
harder and deeper locations, Iran’s no-deal option improves and that of the United States declines.22     
Putting these elements—potential nuclear deals, each side’s interests, and perceived no-
deal options—together in stark form, we conclude that the implications for productive negotiations 
under circumstances as this writing remain negative.  If the Iranian regime places an extremely 
high value on developing a military nuclear capability and sees its no-deal option as eventually 
acquiring such a capability, despite U.S. declaratory policy against such an outcome, while the U.S. 
demands Iranian agreement on limiting its nuclear options, “or else,” it would not appear that a 
                                                              
20 Blair, U.S. Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment. 
21 Quoted in Christopher Hope, “MI6 Chief Sir John Sawers: 'We Foiled Iranian Nuclear Weapons Bid,’” Daily 
Telegraph, July 12, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9396360/MI6-
chief-Sir-John-Sawers-We-foiled-Iranian-nuclear-weapons-bid.html. 
22 Absent a deal, only cost-imposing measures that escalate rapidly enough could reverse this conclusion.   21 
ZOPA exists in negotiations.  If this is correct, then successful negotiations will require more than 
wise process or technique; further concrete actions to create and widen a ZOPA will be necessary in 
addition to tough diplomacy.  
A Simple Analytical Framework: Graphical Development 
 
With these interests, no-deal options, and possible agreements in mind, we can begin to represent 
the analytical framework in graphical form.  As before and with similar caveats to those outlined 
above, the framework begins with a purposefully basic setup — two monolithic parties facing a 
range of simplified nuclear-related deals and the no-deal options that currently prevail — and 
moves to incorporate the effects of sanctions, military threats of varying credibility, and other cost-
imposing moves as well as the effects of incentives and inducements embodied in potential 
agreements.  As an output, the framework illustrates the existence and location of the zone of 
possible agreement, and the range of deals that fall within that ZOPA, given a particular 
combination of costs, incentives, and no-deal options.  Going forward, we can manipulate the 
framework to represent different combinations of no-deal options, include other potential deals, 
and consider how other policy decisions affect the ZOPA and range of feasible agreements. 
The graphical representation of the framework is built around two axes; the horizontal axis 
represents value for the United States, and the vertical axis represents value for the Iranian regime 
(see figure 1).  Thus, moving “up” (or “north”) means increasing value for the Iranian regime 
(where higher “value” is associated with meeting Iranian regime interests more fully), and moving 
“right” (or “east”) means doing the same for the United States.  Running between these axes is a 
downward-sloping “frontier” representing a stylized range of possible outcomes for Iran’s nuclear 
program.  Although a fuller set of creative options might be envisioned, and are later discussed, we   22 
initially focus on outcomes or deals limited to nuclear issues of central concern to policymakers. 
Those options in the upper left are best for Iran, and those in the lower right are best for the United 
States.  The absolute locations of the deals are merely illustrative, but their order is meaningful.23  
This representation of the spectrum of possible nuclear deals is purposefully simplistic.  In reality, 
the spacing between the deals might be irregular, and each party might perceive that spacing 
differently.  Furthermore, it is possible that, from one or the other party’s perspective, there is no 
practical difference between two deals.  For example, the consequences for the United States of an 
Iranian nuclear weapons capability may be roughly the same as those of Iran possessing an actual 
nuclear weapon. Different outcome evaluations than those shown would simply require a redrawn 
“frontier” diagonal.24   
                                                              
23 Were we to move further southeast on the diagonal line of possible agreements, we might include regime 
change as an outcome; similarly, moving further northwest might entail a large Iranian nuclear arsenal plus 
ballistic missile delivery capability.  Moreover, the potential deals displayed on the diagonal line are limited to 
nuclear issues; other, more complex deals, perhaps with other linkages—such as economic, political, or 
security—are discussed subsequently in the section on incentives. 
24 Deals that simultaneously improve each side’s outcomes would cause the frontier to bow outward or 
become convex.   23 




In figure 2, we introduce a series of lines perpendicular to the axes.  Line AB, which crosses 
the deal frontier at “freeze,” represents the United States’ stated position that Iran must, at a 
minimum, freeze its uranium enrichment at current levels.25  For purposes of illustrating the 
framework, we have indicated line CD, which crosses the frontier at or near “weaponization,” as the 
likely (eventual) outcome given current U.S. policy—under the presumption of tightening sanctions 
                                                              
25 The relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including UNSC Resolution 1929, actually call for Iran to 
suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities (which corresponds to “rollback” on the 
indicated frontier).  We judge, however, that the United States’ willingness to consider swapping Iran’s 
indigenously produced low-enriched uranium for highly enriched uranium in October 2009 and its reported 
request in the summer 2012 negotiating rounds that Iran freeze only its 19.75% enrichment activities rather 
than freeze all enrichment work indicate an implicit acceptance by the Obama Administration of some low 
level of uranium enrichment.   24 
but no military action.26 Presumably, somewhere between these two lines lies the true U.S. 
minimum (or “red line”). This red line represents the “most nuclear” Iran the Obama administration 
could accept—and hence its minimum conditions for an acceptable deal—before turning to more 
costly alternatives to negotiation (including military action).   
While we illustrate the graphical framework under the mainstream policy assumptions 
described above, very different views can be readily accommodated.  For example, Kenneth Waltz 
prominently claims that an Iranian bomb would lead to greater Middle East stability, not less.27  His 
argument implies that the consequences of no-deal for the United States would be positive; thus, 
the location of CD would be significantly rightward than its placement under more conventional 
assumptions. 
Line EF represents, from the Iranian regime’s perspective, the minimum acceptable 
outcome of Iran’s nuclear program conditional on a no-deal outcome that leaves Tehran 
undeterred; as such, the regime’s placement represents its red line, or effectively the minimum 
outcome to which it would agree.  The line’s placement reflects the view, discussed earlier, that the 
Iranian regime deems at least a nuclear weapons capability as vital to its interests and, on current 
no-deal policy trajectories, will sooner or later achieve this goal.  Different factions within Iran may 
prefer less or more aggressive outcomes, and the internal struggle among those factions could 
cause EF to move up or down accordingly. 
                                                              
26  The placement of CD is in line with Leon Panetta’s judgment, expressed in note 16 of this article, Of course, 
those who judge that the most likely outcome of current U.S. policy would be more (or less) favorable to U.S. 
interests would shift the location of line CD to the right (or left). 
27 Kenneth Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4, (July/August 2012), pp. 2-5.   25 




With these elements in place under the specified assumptions, we can determine whether 
or not a ZOPA exists, and if so, what range of deals falls within it.  In this “base case,” meant to 
illustrate the present state of the negotiations (as of this writing), whether a ZOPA exists depends 
critically on the location of U.S. and Iranian red lines.  The portion of the deal frontier, if any, that is 
the diagonal line segment above EF (or an alternative horizontal line representing the Iranian red 
line, depending on one’s assessment of Iran’s no-deal options) and to the right of the U.S. red line 
(whether AB, CD, or a line in between)—represents the ZOPA; that is, all of the deals on the portion 
of the diagonal frontier bounded by a line representing the US minimum and EF would be 
acceptable to both parties relative to their no-deal options.  Which of these agreements the two   26 
parties might reach, if any, depends on the previously discussed “at the table” dimensions of the 
negotiation — deal design and negotiating tactics.28  With this in mind, it is clear that if the declared 
U.S. position of AB is the true U.S. minimum, then no ZOPA exists, as the deal frontier would not 
pass through the portion of the graph above EF and to the right of AB.  Given that the Obama 
administration’s true red line is likely to lie somewhere between AB and CD, it is likely that no 
ZOPA currently exists (again, presuming that EF represents the Iranian minimum conditional on the 
regime’s perception of the actual consequences of no deal). 
In most negotiations, neither party has perfect information regarding the other’s true red 
lines given its no-deal options, and therefore must guess at these minimum deal conditions and 
thus the existence and size of the ZOPA, which is that region of the graph that is simultaneously 
better than each side’s no-deal option (northeast of the intersection of CD and EF).  This problem is 
particularly acute in the Iran nuclear negotiations, given the paucity of official U.S. contacts since 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, meaning that the parties’ estimates of each other’s red lines are 
largely based on indirectly informed perceptions.  In addition, each party’s red line is not only a 
matter of executive fiat, but is also the product of side negotiations with internal parties and 
external allies.  Until such side negotiations are concluded, negotiators can only estimate their own 
red lines as well.29  As a result of this process of estimating one’s own and the other party’s red 
                                                              
28  The fact that an agreement is better than actual no-deal options need not imply its acknowledgment or 
acceptance by both parties.  Should the parties involve new issues and invent any additional, creative options 
that fall northeast of the intersection of CD and EF, such options would also lie within the ZOPA.  Such options 
are considered shortly. 
29 Simplistically, even after abstracting from the problem of alliance negotiations, the U.S. red line should be 
located at the point representing the most-nuclear Iran that the United States is willing to accept.  Properly 
determining such a red line, from a prescriptive—not descriptive--standpoint is analytically elaborate, in both 
principle and practice. Think of the U.S. red line as the all-things-considered, maximally acceptable nuclear 
Iran, in the event that negotiations fail and the United States takes corresponding actions.  This outcome 
should set the no-deal value, or lower limit of acceptability, for any negotiated agreement with Iran.   27 
lines, each party will have its own perception of the existence and location of a ZOPA.  Especially in 
a relationship characterized by misunderstanding and poor communication, these two pictures may 
bear little resemblance to each other.  Common bargaining tactics may exacerbate this problem 
further, with potentially dire consequences.30 
REPRESENTING THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS AND INCENTIVES 
 
The two tools employed most frequently by the United States and its allies in an effort to change the 
Iranian regime’s strategic calculus are sanctions (more generally, cost-imposing measures of any 
kind) and incentives (more generally, deal provisions intended to be of value to Iran’s regime or 
value-enhancing measures of any kind).  “Costs” in this formulation can include both punitive 
measures not directly related to Iran’s nuclear program as well as actions that make Iranian 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
 To determine where it should lie, both the expected costs and expected deterrence benefits of increased 
unilateral (nonnegotiated) actions must be considered. In other words, U.S. policymakers should see how bad 
a given outcome really is and ask what costs they should be willing to incur to avoid that outcome in order to 
ensure a better outcome (with “better” here judged net of the associated costs of the deterrence actions).  
More generally, as long as the expected incremental costs of deterrence (including the cost of any benefits 
separately conferred for this purpose) are less than the expected incremental value of increased deterrence 
conditional on those costs, the United States should be willing to incur such further costs.  The resulting 
outcome value should represent the U.S. red line, or the best no-deal option; with this in mind, the United 
States should seek a negotiated outcome superior to the optimal nonnegotiated options. 
30 For a party that desires a negotiated agreement, establishing correct perceptions can raise a thorny tactical 
dilemma.  Imagine that you walk into a car dealership prepared to spend $50,000, but convincingly assert 
that you will not spend a penny over $35,000.  The dealer may not even bother negotiating with you, rather 
than simply offering you a $10,000 break on the $50,000 car that you wanted (a deal that he was actually 
prepared to give you if push came to shove).  In this case, you would have been well advised to soften your 
position to get talks started.  In any negotiation, if the other party views your position as harder line than it 
truly is, there may be utility in partially correcting that impression to convince the other party to give 
negotiations a serious effort.  In doing so, however, you may benefit the other party in any actual negotiation 
by allowing them to press for a deal as close to your red line—and as far from their own—as possible, and 
raise opposition among internal factions.  The reverse is also possible—if, for example, Iran believes the 
United States will not countenance a war, but the United States in fact considers a military attack to be its best 
no-deal option, the regime, in holding out for a better deal, may in fact bring an attack upon itself.     28 
military nuclear potential less likely, further delayed, and otherwise degraded.  Both of these tools, 
and their effects on the ZOPA, can be illustrated using this framework.31   
If, for example, the United States credibly imposes actual and expected no-deal costs of 
magnitude EH on Iran, the Iranian regime’s new minimum would be represented by the line HJ (see 
figure 3).  The new ZOPA would be the portion of the diagonal line above HJ and to the right of the 
U.S. red line (on the assumption that a deal would lead to the removal of the actual sanctions/costs 
or credible threat thereof).  If the U.S. red line were anywhere to the left of the point at which HJ 
intersects the deal frontier, this cost-imposing move will have created or expanded a ZOPA and 
therefore made a broader range of negotiated agreements possible.32   
                                                              
31 For simplicity, we treat the effects of costs as if they were actually imposed. However, genuinely credible, 
specific threats to do so can easily be incorporated in the framework as expected costs.  Similarly, we treat 
effects of incentives as if they were actually conferred in a deal, though genuinely credible promises to do so 
can easily be incorporated into the framework as expected benefits. 
32 Note that, though for clarity we have not indicated it in the graph, measures that obstruct, delay, or degrade 
Iran’s military nuclear capability simultaneously improve the U.S. no-deal option in the event that 
negotiations drag on or fail outright.   29 
Figure 3: The Effect of Sanctions of Magnitude EH on Expanding the ZOPA 
 
We again note that very different views from the mainstream assumptions we have been 
illustrating can easily be accommodated by our graphical framework.  For example, some analysts 
argue that sanctions merely provide a beleaguered Iranian leadership with a classic “rally around 
the flag response” that has the “opposite effect” from that intended.33  Under such an assumption, 
the position of EH would be shifted up, or northward of EF, by the magnitude of the positive effect. 
Similarly, the United States could in the context of an agreement offer incentives that add to 
the value of the agreement for Iran.  In the framework, this would be represented as an upward 
shift of the deal frontier and, depending on the magnitude of the incentives, could extend both north 
                                                              
33 See, for example, George Lopez, “Sanctioning Iran Further Won’t Work,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
January 6, 2010,  http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/sanctioning-iran-further-wont-work.   30 
and east of the diagonal as indicated by the shaded rectangle (see figure 4).34  Such incentives 
would increase the value to Iran of any negotiated agreement, while not changing the value of the 
deal to the United States.   The position of EF does not change, but the ZOPA would become the 
shaded region above EF and to the right of the U.S. red line, whether that is CD, AB, or a line 
between these two.  Even though the two parties’ minima do not change, the shift in the deal 
frontier has positive implications for the existence and location of the ZOPA.  If the U.S. red line 
were anywhere to the left of the point at which EF intersects the new deal frontier, the credible 
offer of meaningful incentives will have created or expanded a ZOPA and therefore made a broader 
range of negotiated agreements possible.  It is worth noting that none of the deals that are newly 
located in the ZOPA in this scenario are “worse” for the United States than what it would have been 
prepared to accept before offering the incentives.35 
                                                              
34 With incentives, agreement would encompass more than the purely nuclear-related deals considered up to 
this point, and would better be characterized as packages of nuclear provisions and other issues. 
35 This would be true unless the incentives were costly to the United States to offer, in which case the deal 
frontier would shift to the left by the magnitude of the cost.   31 
Figure 4. The Effect of Incentives on the ZOPA  
 
 
This effect can also operate in reverse; that is, if the United States provides Iran with 
disincentives, the deal frontier shifts downward, constricting or eliminating the ZOPA (see figure 5).  
An example of such a disincentive would be the precondition that Iran suspend uranium 
enrichment during any negotiations; this represents a cost for Iran, but unlike the costs discussed 
above, it is associated not with a refusal to negotiate but with an agreement to negotiate.  Thus it 
operates not like a cost (shifting EF downward), but as a reverse incentive, or disincentive.  This 
assumes, it should be noted, that the precondition is reversible — that is, if no deal is reached, the 
condition ceases to hold, and if a deal is reached, the condition is not necessarily a part of it.  If the 
precondition is irreversible, it would behave as a cost or as a modification of the deal itself and thus 
would be represented by movement along the frontier, depending on the precondition in question.    32 
This is not to say that preconditions should or should not be used; rather that, when they are 
employed, their impact on the ZOPA should be kept in mind. 
Figure 5.  The Effect of Preconditions on the ZOPA 
 
 
In the case of the Iran nuclear negotiations, sanctions and incentives need not be used 
separately, but could be paired to amplify the effect on the Iranian regime’s calculations.  This 
possibility can be represented in the framework by combining the imposition of costs of magnitude 
EH (creating a new Iranian minimum of HJ) with offering incentives that shift the deal frontier 
upward (see figure 6) and may extend it further “northeast.”  The combined effect of these two is a 
new ZOPA above HJ and to the right of the U.S. red line.  The combined effect of these policies is to 
further expand the ZOPA — in this (illustrative) case, creating a ZOPA even if the true U.S. red line is 
its declared position of AB.  Previously infeasible agreements are moved into the ZOPA, providing   33 
greater leeway for U.S. and Iranian negotiators and therefore increasing the chances of a negotiated 
agreement, given the right negotiating process and tactics. 




Costs and Incentives That Can Affect the ZOPA 
 
The challenge that has bedeviled international diplomacy over Iran’s nuclear program is identifying 
policy levers that can bring Iran to the negotiating table and influence its decisions.  Too often, costs 
and incentives are thought of simplistically as “punishments” and “rewards,” and are wielded 
haphazardly and independently; instead, they should be used in concert as part of a coordinated 
strategy to open a ZOPA and provide diplomacy with a prospect for success.     34 
While the term “costs” is frequently equated with sanctions, this is too narrow.  We use 
“costs” for any measures that meaningfully worsen the hard-line regime’s alternatives to reaching 
agreement on its nuclear program.  While costs certainly include sanctions, the term also includes 
any measures that delay, degrade, or stop Iran’s efforts at military uses of nuclear power; actions 
that impose negative consequences not directly related to its nuclear program (e.g., travel bans on 
top Iranian officials); as well as the level of expectation that no-deal will lead to military action.  
This last clause merits elaboration: it is not necessary for a cost to be actually imposed for it to 
worsen the Iranian regime’s no deal option.  If the regime has an ironclad level of certainty that 
such measures will be forthcoming absent a deal or if specified red lines are crossed—and this, of 
course, is a big “if”—the threatened cost analytically functions the same as an imposed cost. This 
leads to a broader discussion: to be effective, any cost or incentive must meet three criteria. 
First, costs and incentives must enjoy credibility in the eyes of the other party.  To this end, 
actions speak louder than words.  For example, if the United States were to threaten Iran militarily 
while making no visible effort to prepare the ground politically or practically for such actions, the 
“military option” will lack credibility.  It certainly does not help that, according to Graham Allison, 
the United States and its allies have allowed Iran to cross multiple red lines over eighteen years 
with few consequences.36  Likewise, it is undoubtedly instructive to Iran that the United States 
largely acquiesced to a North Korean nuclear weapons capability after having repeatedly declared 
such an eventuality “unacceptable.”  The regime may see certain sanctions, in particular, as less 
credible if it believes that the sanctions will begin to crumble as soon as Iran obtains nuclear 
weapons. Similarly, if U.S. negotiators offer to lift sanctions, but that action requires the cooperation 
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of a Congress that is opposed to the measure, the incentive would not be credible.  Credibility is also 
reinforced (or undermined) by actions and policies in other arenas.   
Second, costs and incentives must also be meaningful as regards the regime’s actual 
interests — costs must threaten those interests and incentives must further them.  In other words, 
they must be in the right “currency.”  It is easy to wrongly project one’s view of the other’s interests; 
for example, although better relations with the United States or membership in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) may seem like obvious “pluses” to Iran’s hard-line regime, it may instead see 
these as undesirable, even as threats if regime survival depends on isolation and stoking domestic 
Iranian paranoia about “external enemies.”  Getting the “currency” right, and thus effectively 
employing costs and incentives, requires an accurate understanding of how the regime perceives its 
interests.   
Third, beyond merely harming Iranian interests, costs must be of sufficient magnitude 
relative to the regime’s perception of the value of its no-deal option to sufficiently shift the Iranian 
red line downward (e.g., from EF to HJ in figure 3), and thus, to have an appreciable effect on the 
potential ZOPA.  Benefits must be of analogous magnitude to induce an upward and rightward 
(“northeast”) shift in the ZOPA.  The scant examples of previous strategic shifts by Iran suggest that 
the regime is prepared to endure heavy costs in pursuit of what it sees as vital interests.  One such 
shift occurred when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini accepted a cease-fire to end the bloody, eight-
year Iran-Iraq War — after insisting he would never do so — only after Iran’s navy had been 
soundly beaten by the United States and an Iranian civilian airliner was mistakenly shot down by 
the USS Vincennes.  Another may have occurred in 2003, when, spurred by the U.S. invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq and fears that Iran could be next, Iran apparently suspended its nuclear   36 
weaponization work and entered nuclear negotiations with the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany.  Of course, apart from moves that impose unrelated costs on Iran, actions that directly 
obstruct, delay, or otherwise degrade the military potential of Iran’s nuclear program by definition 
shift its no-deal option downward. 
In thinking about which costs and incentives to employ, the United States and its allies need 
to assess not only the effectiveness of the measures according to these three criteria, but also the 
cost to themselves of imposing the measures.  Although for purposes of exposition when laying out 
the framework above, we assumed that costs and incentives could be used costlessly by the United 
States, this is not true in general.  For example, the restrictions in place on Iran’s oil exports have 
reportedly taken more than 1.2 million barrels per day or more oil off world markets, which 
presumably has resulted in higher oil prices than would otherwise prevail. 
COSTS 
 
As noted above, when devising costs to impose on the Iranian regime for pursuing a nuclear 
weapons capability, it is critical to understand how the regime itself perceives its interests.  For 
many years, the United States utilized broad sanctions in an effort to isolate Iran, including a ban on 
all imports from Iran in 1987 and a ban on almost all exports to and investment in Iran in 1995.  
Certain elements of the Iranian regime, however, may welcome such isolation from the United 
States.  In part, this exemplifies the routine desire shared by autocratic regimes to regulate and 
restrict their citizens’ interactions with the outside world.  Yet as Iran expert Karim Sadjadpour has 
observed,37 under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran has held independence and self-sufficiency 
as two core political values.   Khamenei believes that previous Iranian rulers were weakened and 
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corrupted by reliance on foreign powers, and he is determined that his regime will rely on 
indigenous advances.  As a result, it is unlikely that he views being cut off from the U.S. politically or 
economically in negative terms.   
Since 2000, the U.S. approach to costs has changed, mostly focusing  on measures more 
deliberately targeting the interests of the regime and the programs (nuclear, ballistic missile, 
terrorism sponsorship) of greatest international concern.  Insofar as those measures enjoy greater 
multilateral support and threaten more directly the interests of the regime, they better meet the 
first two criteria mentioned above in being credible and meaningful.  And, of course, far more 
severe sanctions have been imposed in 2012 on Iran’s oil exports and transactions involving its 
central bank.  These have led to substantial drops in Iran’s oil exports (on which 70 percent of its 
budget depends) and a dramatic fall in the Iranian rial—and sharpens the question among analysts 
“Will Iran crack?”38  If one accepts the provisional conclusion, certainly as of the Moscow 
negotiations in June 2012, that a ZOPA has not yet become evident, it follows that the actual and 
prospective costs imposed on Iran to date have themselves been insufficient in magnitude relative 
to its no-deal option.    
While the United States and its allies may eventually conclude that diplomatic efforts to 
open a ZOPA and reach a nuclear deal with Iran have failed and turn instead to no-deal options, 
they can be expected to continue seeking tighter sanctions to impose until such a conclusion is 
reached.  Singly or in combination, such costs could be represented in the graphical framework by 
their effects on EF and, in some cases, on CD—in that they improve the outcome for the United 
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States as long as no deal is reached, or if negotiations utterly fail (see figures 2 and 3).  These cost-
imposing measures can be placed into two broad categories based on their effects on the elements 
of the analytical framework described above. 
The first category is “side costs.” The analytic opposite of side payments, these are costs that 
reduce the “net value” to Iran of its no-deal option (an eventual nuclear weapons capability), but 
are otherwise substantively unrelated to the nuclear issue.  Examples would include additional 
restrictions on global trade with Iran or sanctions on international firms that provide goods or 
services used by the Iranian regime in perpetrating human rights abuses.  Such measures have their 
own merits and drawbacks, but they do not in themselves directly interfere with Iran’s ability to 
achieve its nuclear aims.  Nor do they improve the U.S. outcome in the event of no deal; analytically, 
they move EF down. 
The second category comprises measures to delay/degrade/stop Iran’s nuclear program. 
These are measures that directly or indirectly worsen Iran’s nuclear no-deal option.  By this, we 
mean actions that increase the difficulty or time required for Iran to achieve its military nuclear 
aims, that degrade the effectiveness of that program, or that completely block its success.  We note 
that the effects of such measures on Iran’s nuclear program may occur during negotiations—as long 
as no deal is reached—or if negotiations definitively fail.  Importantly, such measures 
simultaneously improve the U.S. no-deal option and therefore may decrease the urgency—or, 
conceivably, the need at all—for the United States and its allies to reach a deal with Iran.   (In this 
sense, such actions move line segment CD to the right.)  These measures can target the nuclear 
program itself — for example, by prohibiting the export to Iran of essential nuclear components or 
dual-use items — or support functions such as restrictions on shipping and finance.     39 
Coercive actions, such as military strikes, also fall into the second category of costs, but their 
qualitatively different character merits further, separate discussion.  If credible, under the 
assumptions we have outlined, military threats worsen Iranian perceptions of the consequences of 
failure to reach a deal.  (Actual use of force, to the extent it were effective in delaying/degrading the 
Iranian nuclear program, could directly improve the no-deal option of the United States, though 
presumably the scope for agreement at that point would be almost nil—or the kind of negotiations 
subsequent to such action would likely be qualitatively different from those preceding it.)  
Independent of the underlying benefits and drawbacks of the use of force, increasing the credibility 
and salience of the military option seems to be a major way to open up a ZOPA by worsening no-
deal perceptions.  Instances of Iran making strategic shifts — whether by signing a cease-fire at the 
end of the Iran-Iraq War or suspending weaponization work around 2003 — suggest that a credible 
military threat can potently influence the regime’s calculus, which is unsurprising if regime survival 
is its primary interest and military action would threaten it.  The realistic prospect of military 
action may also strengthen the U.S. coalition by motivating those allies with important commercial 
concerns (e.g., China) to cooperate more fully with sanctions and other measures in hopes of 
forestalling armed conflict that would be inimical to their interests.  
Steps that appear to lay the groundwork for military action (e.g., regional exercises or 
prepositioning of military assets) are likely to enhance the credibility of coercive measures.  On the 
other hand, purely defensive measures aimed at containing Iran, though perhaps prudent on their 
merits, may have the opposite effect of signaling international resignation to a nuclear-armed Iran.  
Thus, care should be taken in the way such defensive steps are implemented and publicly framed.    40 
As mentioned above, reinforcing the threat of military force should worsen Iran’s no-deal 
option and increase the prospects for opening a ZOPA, though some analysts argue that the regime 
would welcome the “rally-round-the-flag” effect of military actions (in which case the intended 
coercive effects would be reversed).  If, however, Iran perceives that military action is not an 
alternative to a negotiated outcome for the United States with respect to nuclear issues, but rather 
the United States really seeks regime change, the efficacy of the military threat on nuclear issues 
would be diminished. In this case, Iran would perceive the U.S. red line shifting sharply to the right, 
leading to a narrowing or elimination of the Iranian estimation of the ZOPA.39  If the regime is 
convinced that the nuclear talks are a proxy or cover for a policy of regime change, no deal will be 
possible.  However, the threat of military action — absent a nuclear agreement — which could 
degrade the regime is not incompatible with negotiations, because it is a consequence of “no-deal” 
rather than the actual U.S. objective. 
INCENTIVES 
 
As with costs, designing credible, meaningful, and high-impact incentives requires a clear 
understanding of how the Iranian regime sees its interests.  Similar to costs, incentives can be 
grouped into three broad categories. 
The first category is removal of negatives.  These incentives are essentially the reversal or 
removal of costs previously imposed or threatened.  These could include the lifting of sanctions, 
security or nonbelligerency guarantees, and other such measures. 
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The second category is composed of side payments.  These are incentives meant to increase 
the “net value” to Iran of a particular agreement that are otherwise unrelated to the nuclear issue 
except as a bargaining tactic.  In addition, these incentives do not directly advance U.S. interests, 
and so add no value to the agreement from the U.S. perspective.  These could include agricultural 
assistance, trade agreements, assistance with civil aviation, and other such measures. 
The third category comprises joint gains, incentives that increase the value of a particular 
agreement to both Iran and the United States, and can thus be thought of as “win-win.”  These might 
include measures in the areas of counternarcotics, cooperation on Afghan security, and the like.  As 
an accompaniment to a solid, verifiable nuclear deal, actions that increase Iran’s oil output could 
offer joint gain in that available global oil supplies would increase, prices would fall, and Iranian 
government revenues would increase. To the extent, however, that the Iranian regime seems to 
view its relations with the United States in zero-sum terms, the opportunities for joint gains appear 
slim. 
Devising incentives that are enticing to Iran and palatable to the United States has proven 
difficult.  Although threatening the regime’s interests with costs is generally an easy sell politically 
in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, satisfying the regime’s interests through incentives is 
more complicated.  Helping the regime ensure its survival — for example, by forgoing support for 
dissidents or offering security or nonbelligerency guarantees — is morally problematic for the 
United States and its allies, and would encounter stiff opposition in those countries.    42 
As a result of this conundrum, the United States and its allies tend to offer incentives that 
suggest an unrealistic reading of the Iranian regime’s interests.40  This is borne out by an example 
from recent years.  The United States dropped its objection to Iran joining the WTO in 2005 after 
receiving criticism from the EU, Iran, and others; since that time, however, Iran has done little to 
pursue WTO membership, and in December 2010, the Iranian Parliament voted to further slow 
down the (nearly halted) process of WTO accession.41  If, as previously noted, the hard-line regime 
values political and economic independence and self-sufficiency, it is easy to see why it would find 
WTO membership, and similar measures such as full normalization of relations with the United 
States, problematic. 
Correspondingly, the incentives that have already been offered by the United States and its 
allies — the suspension of sanctions, reassurances regarding Iran’s territorial integrity, cooperation 
on civil nuclear energy, regional security, trade, and civil aviation, as well as assistance with 
agricultural, economic, and technological development — have thus far elicited scant interest from 
Iran.  This suggests that the regime either does not value such inducements, at least relative to a 
nuclear path, or in its deep suspicion of Western aims, deems them not credible or of insufficient 
magnitude.  The Iranian regime may suffer from a principal-agent problem as well, in that certain 
incentives may be beneficial to Iran as a nation, but the benefit to the Iranian regime or individual 
Iranian officials of accepting them is outweighed by the political cost of doing so.  The perverse 
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effect of the regime’s dismissal of such offers is that the United States and its allies often see little 
choice but to rely heavily on costs going forward. 
Although the history is discouraging, it is possible that these or other potentially value-
enhancing items could be made more credible and attractive, especially if Iran’s no-deal option 
worsens.  Thus far, this has not proven to be the case.  It is worth noting that such incentives are 
directed not only at Iranian negotiators. Highlighting genuine willingness to offer broader benefits, 
as well as to impose costs, is in part intended to send a message to Iranians beyond the hard-line 
regime as well as to non-Iranian parties whose full cooperation is valuable to this strategy. 
Assessment of Past U.S. Efforts via the Framework 
 
Given that the administrations of both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama, in 
concert with other nations, have employed costs and incentives in combination, as well as different 
diplomatic approaches to the negotiations, the question arises of why neither was (to date) able to 
negotiate successfully with Iran, directly or tacitly.  Or, more fundamentally, did a ZOPA exist or was 
one created that would permit a successful negotiation?  The analytical framework introduced 
above can provide some insight into this question. 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
 
The public revelation of clandestine Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak in 2002 led to 
significant international focus and action on Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  The resulting 
pressure was amplified by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, which left Iran effectively surrounded 
by U.S. forces.  Iran subsequently entered negotiations with the “EU3” — France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom — which resulted in a series of agreements according to which Iran agreed to 
suspend uranium enrichment (but not, ultimately, to give it up indefinitely).   44 
While the pressures on Iran were accumulating, the Bush administration’s position appears 
to have been hardening.  Although the United States and Iran warily cooperated with each other 
regarding Afghanistan in 2001,42 there was a widespread perception — in part resulting from 
Washington’s refusal to participate in the EU3’s negotiations — that by 2003 the United States was 
more interested in “regime change” in Iran than in a negotiated nuclear agreement.  Thus, Iran’s red 
line may have been moving downward (implying greater Iranian nuclear flexibility) as a result of 
the costs imposed by increased international diplomatic pressure and the palpable threat of U.S. 
military attack, but at the same time the U.S. red line appears to have been moving rightward 
(becoming more demanding) — or at least Iran and others perceived it to be so — dampening the 
potential for a ZOPA to be created.  Whether or not there was a ZOPA at this time ultimately 
remained untested, as no formal U.S.-Iran negotiations took place. 
By 2005, when the Bush administration agreed to join the EU3’s negotiations with Iran on 
the condition that Iran suspend uranium enrichment prior to any talks, the pressure on Iran had 
decreased.  Iran likely deemed the threat of U.S. attack to be significantly lower than in 2003; it had 
escaped to that point any meaningful penalties attending the revelation of its clandestine nuclear 
weapons efforts; and it had not been held to account for violating a series of agreements with the 
EU3 from 2003 to 2005.  Furthermore, politics inside Iran had shifted with the replacement of the 
reform-minded President Mohammad Khatami with the then-obscure hard-liner Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad.  While pressure on Iran increased from 2005 to 2008 with the addition of Russia and 
China to what became the P5+1 coalition and the imposition of multiple rounds of sanctions, the 
pressure increased too slowly to compensate for the large gap between U.S. and Iranian red lines, 
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likely preventing a ZOPA from opening.  In any event, only one meeting on the nuclear issue with 
both the United States and Iran present was held, in Geneva in July 2008, and it yielded no progress.    
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
On assuming the presidency, Barack Obama emphasized “engagement” with Iran, which sought to 
reassure Tehran that the United States was not intent on regime change but dedicated to a 
negotiated outcome to the nuclear dispute.  Although not formally abandoned, the precondition that 
Iran suspend enrichment before talks with the United States, already weakened by U.S. attendance 
at the May 2008 P5+1 meeting with Iran, was further attenuated by President Obama’s initiatives.  
The U.S. proposal of October 2009—to accept Iran’s low-enriched uranium in return for highly 
enriched uranium necessary for fuel rods to produce medical isotopes in the Tehran Research 
Reactor—was widely seen as an indication that the United States was prepared to accept some 
Iranian enrichment activity, a perception reinforced by the P5+1’s request in 2012 talks that Iran 
freeze only its higher-level enrichment.  In addition, the declaration by President Obama and other 
senior U.S. officials that Iran having “a nuclear weapon” was the U.S. red line may have conveyed the 
impression to Tehran that nuclear progress short of that marker would be accepted by Washington, 
albeit grudgingly.  The main effect of this diplomatic campaign was likely to shift Iran’s perception 
of the U.S. red line leftward (i.e., that the United States was more flexible), explaining at least in part 
its willingness to return to formal negotiations in 2012. 
In the process of reassuring Iran, however, the Obama administration likely diminished the 
credibility of a military attack as a threatened cost to Iran. Although President Obama and his top 
officials have for the most part maintained that the military option remains “on the table,” senior 
Defense Department officials and others have been at pains to downplay the likelihood of a military   46 
attack, stressing its downsides in public remarks while publicly counseling Israel against an attack 
as well.43  The perception that the Obama administration had put aside the military option was 
reinforced by a public emphasis on containing a future nuclear-armed Iran,44 as well as by a 
reported Defense Department memo lamenting the White House’s refusal to that point to allow 
serious consideration of even a modest military component to its Iran strategy.45  Thus even though 
the Obama administration has succeeded in securing serious new sanctions on Iran—and has 
subsequently begun visible military actions46—the resulting pressure may have been weakened or 
counteracted by the diminished credibility of the U.S. military threat.   
Just as domestic politics played a role in the U.S. shift, however, Iranian politics continued to 
harden the regime’s positions on the nuclear issue.  The June 2009 election turmoil likely put the 
regime in no mood to be conciliatory toward the West for fear of appearing weak or desperate, and 
may also have weakened Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei’s authority and thus his ability to make 
bold changes in policy.  At the same time, dislike of President Ahmadinejad within conservative 
circles may have contributed to political fractiousness and the rejection by Tehran of the October 
2009 fuel-swap deal.  Regarding the analytical framework, then, the U.S. red line may have indeed 
been shifting leftward, but the combined effect of new sanctions and diminished military threat was 
ambiguous, while domestic considerations may have shifted Iran’s red line upward.  Thus, as during 
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President Bush’s time in office, during President Obama’s tenure to date some factors have moved 
in favor of creating a ZOPA, but others have militated against it. 
Conclusion 
 
This study has sought to develop an analytic framework by which to assess a fundamental question 
potentially underlying the failure of the Iran nuclear negotiations over several years: while 
mistrust, misperception, and flawed diplomacy may play roles, does a mutually acceptable deal 
even exist?  To assess this possibility, a negotiation analytic framework conceptually disentangles 
two issues: (1) whether a feasible deal exists and (2) how to design the most promising process to 
achieve one.  Focusing on the first of these questions, whether a “zone of possible agreement” 
exists, this study has developed a graphical negotiation analysis—open to a wide range of policy 
assumptions—that precisely relates input assumptions about the parties’ interests, their no-deal 
options, and possible deals, as well as the effects of cost-imposing and value-enhancing measures. 
A full audit of the barriers standing in the way of a nuclear agreement between Iran and the 
United States would turn up a multitude of issues.  Among them would certainly be mutual distrust 
arising from thirty years of estrangement and hostility, paucity of official contact or communication, 
the politics in both the United States and Iran over the two countries’ fraught relationship, the 
radical ideology and political fractiousness of the Iranian regime, as well as poor negotiating tactics 
and missed opportunities by both sides.   
Various efforts, both official and unofficial, have rightly been made to address these and 
other barriers to U.S.-Iranian rapprochement.  Yet, the failure by multiple parties via a variety of 
negotiating processes to make serious progress toward a sustainable nuclear agreement with Iran 
suggests a deeper cause — the absence of any underlying zone of possible agreement.  Simply put, a   48 
wide gulf apparently stands between the least nuclear capability the Iranian regime is willing to 
accept and the most nuclear capability the United States is prepared to concede to Iran.  No 
combination of costs and incentives yet put forward has apparently matched the value that the 
regime likely sees as its no-deal option — a nuclear weapons capability or actual weaponization. 
If indeed there is no ZOPA, a central focus on diplomatic processes or tactics is misplaced.  
Rather than tweaking the design of the deal offered to Iran — for example, by adjusting the phases 
and what is offered in each — U.S. policymakers and negotiators should consider as their most 
urgent priority influencing the “setup” in order to create and widen a ZOPA.  It makes little sense to 
float this or that proposal — much less make one’s best or bottom-line offer on nuclear-related 
issues — without confidence that the ground has been prepared for negotiations to succeed.  
Instead, it makes much more sense to use diplomacy to develop a better understanding of the other 
side that will help open or widen a ZOPA. 
Creating a zone of possible agreement requires moving beyond fixations with one tactic or 
class of moves — for example, sanctions, military maneuvers, or engagement — without regard to 
the net effect on a ZOPA of the full range of policy actions.  Instead, it requires that costs, incentives, 
and red lines be combined consciously as elements of a strategy to create a ZOPA that is 
simultaneously better for both sides than acquiescence or attack.  This is the purpose of the 
analytical framework laid out above — to provide a tool for putting deliberate assessments of the 
distinct elements of the nuclear negotiations in proper analytic relationship to each other in order 
to draw valid conclusions and develop policy options.  To accomplish this, policymakers should take 
the following four steps.   49 
First, in a disciplined and systematic manner, assess the Iranian regime’s interests and 
perceptions of its no-deal options.  It is remarkable that, more than thirty years after the rupturing 
of U.S.-Iran relations, little consensus exists among foreign policy analysts and practitioners 
regarding Iran’s interests and ambitions; by the same point in the existence of the Soviet Union, 
George Kennan had already written his authoritative work on the “sources of Soviet conduct.”47  
Cataloguing Iranian interests and perceived no-deal options requires robust, high-quality 
information and interpretations on the dynamics and deliberations of the Iranian regime.  To the 
extent such information (and therefore sound assessments) is lacking, the United States and its like-
minded partners should seek out or develop new channels for obtaining it. 
Second, in a disciplined and systematic manner, determine U.S. interests and no-deal 
options.  U.S. interests that would be affected by an Iranian nuclear weapons capability are 
relatively uncontroversial, but a clear understanding of U.S. no-deal options and red lines requires 
early and active consultation with domestic parties such as Congress and coalition partners. 
Third, in a disciplined and systematic manner, catalog and rigorously assess all available 
levers — both incentives (value-enhancing provisions embodied in potential agreements) as well as 
cost-imposing measures.  Carefully judge their credibility, relevance to actual Iranian regime 
interests, and magnitude relative to Iranian no-deal options of each possible measure, as well as to 
the cost to the United States of deploying the measure.  Further, the impacts of such measures on 
coalition partners and other unrelated parties and interests should be part of the evaluation.  
Ideally, creative agreements can embody high-value, low-cost moves that result in joint benefit.    
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In particular, careful assessment of these distinct elements of the nuclear negotiations will 
help to provide a sharper answer to the issue of whether a ZOPA exists, and, if so, its most likely 
location. This assessment will not provide a single policy prescription.  Rather, it will permit 
policymakers and analysts to move beyond bumper-sticker policy assertions in favor of or against 
engagement, sanctions, military actions, confidence-building measures, and the like.  This will help 
to illuminate the multiple policy strategies — that is, sets of policy choices that together advance a 
particular goal — that can open a zone of possible agreement and permit the negotiations to 
succeed. 
Fourth, to the greatest extent possible, take coordinated action involving the full set of 
policy levers to create and widen a ZOPA.  Conceptually, as this article illustrates, there are two 
ways to create or expand a ZOPA.  First, the United States could relax its own red line, as US officials 
appear to have done in recent years, by acquiescing in a hitherto rejected outcome or deal.  Of 
course, the United States should not seek a nuclear agreement for its own sake, only one that is 
genuinely better for U.S. interests than either war or acquiescence to a nuclear Iran.  By drawing the 
line at Iran not having “a nuclear weapon,” rather than a nuclear weapons capability, and by 
acquiescing to some uranium enrichment by Iran, the United States has begun to entertain deals 
that previously would have been judged worse than its no-deal option of military conflict.  But, 
without a persuasive explanation by U.S. officials as to why accepting a “more nuclear” Iran is less 
damaging to U.S. interests than previously concluded, or why on the other hand Washington’s no-
deal option of military conflict is more damaging to those interests, the Obama administration risks 
a situation in which it allows Iran to perceive a flexibility or irresolution in the U.S. position that   51 
may not exist either with the current administration or because future administrations, the U.S. 
Congress, or U.S. allies will not accept the resulting deal.   
With respect to the analytical framework presented here, this dilemma clearly illustrates 
the difference between negotiating tactics and the underlying negotiation “setup.”  By taking a 
conciliatory tone and offering “face-saving” deals to Iran, U.S. officials may hope to jump-start 
negotiations.  But if at the same time they give Tehran the impression that the U.S. red line is to the 
left of its actual location (implying greater U.S. nuclear flexibility in this article’s graphical 
representation), it would give Iran a false impression of the location of a ZOPA.  The perverse result 
would be that Iran could believe that negotiations are succeeding when the United States believes 
they are failing, leading to a conflict that might have been prevented had the United States been 
clearer and firmer about its red lines and provided Tehran with a more accurate sense of the ZOPA.    
Instead of making changes to US red lines that are not advisable, or hinting at flexibility that 
does not actually exist, the United States should emphasize expanding the ZOPA by wielding cost-
imposing and value-enhancing measures effectively in concert.  This sounds deceptively 
straightforward; it is anything but.  As discussed above, both costs and incentives must meet three 
criteria.  First, they must be credible.  Yet until recently, the United States (and Israel) has 
consistently undercut perhaps its most effective means of pressure — the threat of military force — 
by downplaying that threat, failing to take visible measures to increase its credibility, and publicly 
fretting about its effectiveness and downsides.  Whatever those downsides may be, emphasizing 
them publicly is counterproductive in terms of influencing the Iranian regime’s perception of the 
costs of no-deal.     52 
Costs and incentives must also be meaningful for the Iranian regime’s interests rather than 
a box-checking exercise.  Many of the sanctions imposed on Iran had little impact on the regime’s 
core interests, until recent measures targeting its oil export revenues and access to the 
international financial system were enacted.  For a regime concerned about survival, increased 
support for its domestic opposition might also prove a powerful motivation to change course.  With 
respect to incentives, the Iranian regime likely places little value on many of the items offered by 
the United States such as WTO membership or improved diplomatic relations. 
Finally, such measures must be of sufficient magnitude relative to the value Iran places on 
its nuclear program; we can surmise that this value is very high, given the enormous sacrifices the 
regime has endured to sustain the program.  This may be the criterion on which U.S. actions have 
fallen most significantly short.  Sanctions have been applied sporadically and in increments.  The 
tendency to focus on the marginal effect of each measure — rather than on the overall effect on the 
ZOPA of all such measures — has hamstrung U.S. efforts to create the conditions necessary for a 
negotiated agreement.  It also reflects a broader tendency to focus on costs and incentives 
individually, rather employing them in concert as elements of a strategy to open a ZOPA.  
If, as seems likely based on our relatively limited analysis under mainstream policy 
assumptions, the Iranian regime’s no-deal option thus far appears superior (from its perspective) to 
the agreements on offer, a ZOPA may not exist at present.  The absence of a ZOPA would pose an 
insurmountable barrier to agreement that would defeat all tactical and process-oriented initiatives.  
To open space for a worthwhile nuclear deal—one that avoids both military conflict and a nuclear-
armed Iran—the United States should embrace a relentless and creative strategy to worsen Iran’s 
no-deal options while demonstrating the value of a “yes” to the regime as well as to the broader   53 
Iranian populace.   This requires a firm red line, clearly communicated; costs and incentives that are 
credible, meaningful, and of sufficient magnitude; and the wherewithal to combine these disparate 
elements of policy into a coherent strategy to create and expand a ZOPA.  
Without an underlying zone of possible agreement, a primary focus on negotiation process 
and tactics—getting the right tone, venue, communication style, framing, level of secrecy, use of 
back channels or third parties, and so on—cannot work.  However, if tough, skillful diplomacy—
including, if necessary, the credible threat of force—succeeds in opening and widening a zone of 
agreement,  the sophisticated use of these and other process tools will be key to reaching a 
worthwhile agreement.   If no zone of possible agreement can be created despite these efforts, then 
the policy focus necessarily must shift to the tough choices among nonnegotiated options.  